The Death Penalty: Should the Judge or the Jury Decide Who Dies? by Hans, Valerie P. et al.
Cornell University Law School
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
3-2015
The Death Penalty: Should the Judge or the Jury
Decide Who Dies?
Valerie P. Hans
Cornell Law School, valerie.hans@cornell.edu
John H. Blume
Cornell Law School, jb94@cornell.edu
Theodore Eisenberg
Cornell Law School (deceased)
Amelia Courtney Hritz
Cornell University
Sheri L. Johnson
Cornell Law School, slj8@cornell.edu
See next page for additional authors
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hans, Valerie P. and Blume, John H. and Eisenberg, Theodore and Hritz, Amelia Courtney and Johnson, Sheri Lynn and Royer, Caisa
E. and Wells, Martin T., "The Death Penalty: Should the Judge or the Jury Decide Who Dies?" 12 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies,
70-99 (2015)
Authors
Valerie P. Hans, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Amelia Courtney Hritz, Sheri L. Johnson, Caisa
Elizabeth Royer, and Martin T. Wells
This article is available at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/1565
The Death Penalty: Should the Judge or
the Jury Decide Who Dies?
Valerie P. Hans, John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Amelia Courtney Hritz,
Sheri Lynn Johnson, Caisa Elizabeth Royer, and Martin T. Wells*
This article addresses the effect of judge versus jury decision making through analysis of a
database of all capital sentencing phase hearing trials in the State of Delaware from 1977–
2007. Over the three decades of the study, Delaware shifted responsibility for death penalty
sentencing from the jury to the judge. Currently, Delaware is one of the handful of states that
gives the judge the final decision-making authority in capital trials. Controlling for a number
of legally relevant and other predictor variables, we find that the shift to judge sentencing
significantly increased the number of death sentences. Statutory aggravating factors,
stranger homicides, and the victim’s gender also increased the likelihood of a death sen-
tence, as did the county of the homicide. We reflect on the implications of these results for
debates about the constitutionality of judge sentencing in capital cases.
I. Introduction
This article examines the impact of having the judge or the jury as the decisionmaker in
capital trials. In Woodward v. Alabama, a dissent from a denial of certiorari, Supreme Court
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Breyer, questioned the constitutionality and the impact
of employing judges as opposed to juries as the final arbiter of death sentences in the
United States.1 This article addresses the effect of judge versus jury decision making
through analysis of a unique database of all capital sentencing phase hearing trials in the
State of Delaware in the modern period of capital punishment, from 1977–2007. Delaware
*Address correspondence to Valerie P. Hans, Professor of Law, Cornell Law School, Ithaca, NY 14853; email:
valerie.hans@cornell.edu. Hans is also Professor Emerita, University of Delaware; Blume is Professor of Law; Director
of Clinical, Advocacy and Skills Program, and Director, Death Penalty Project, Cornell Law School; until his death in
2014, Theodore Eisenberg was Henry Allen Mark Professor of Law and Adjunct Professor of Statistical Sciences,
Cornell University; Hritz is a graduate student in the dual J.D./Ph.D. Developmental Psychology and Law Program,
Cornell University; Johnson is James and Mark Flanagan Professor of Law, Associate Dean for Public Engagement,
and Assistant Director, Death Penalty Project, Cornell Law School; Royer is a graduate student in the dual J.D./Ph.D.
Developmental Psychology and Law Program, Cornell University; Wells is Charles A. Alexander Professor of Statistical
Sciences, Cornell University.
Financial support for this research project was provided by the Cornell Death Penalty Project <http://
www.lawschool.cornell.edu/research/death-penalty-project/About.cfm> and by Cornell Law School’s faculty
research funds to Valerie Hans.
1Woodward v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 405 (2013) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
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is one of a handful of states that currently gives the judge rather than the jury the final
judgment in a capital case. Over the three decades of the study, Delaware shifted respon-
sibility for death penalty sentencing from the jury to the judge. These different sentencing
approaches provide a rare opportunity to contrast the operation of jury and judge decision
making within a single state.
Other studies of judge versus jury death penalty sentencing have compared
decisionmakers across jurisdictions, or have examined judicial overrides of jury decisions
within a state.2 Delaware’s experience offers the chance to examine how a state’s capital
punishment system changes when judges or juries are the ultimate decisionmakers. This has
significance not only for the State of Delaware, but also for other states that have modified
their approaches or that are considering changing their sentencing schemes in capital cases.
Moreover, it also bears on the question raised in Sotomayor’s dissent from denial of
certiorari: Does capital sentencing by judges violate the Sixth and Eighth Amendments?3
Although there is substantial research about the nationwide operation of capital
punishment,4 empirical research on Delaware’s death penalty is modest in amount.5 The
2John Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Martin T. Wells, Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Composition,
1 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 165 (2004) (comparing outcomes in states with judge vs. jury sentencing schemes); William
J. Bowers, Wanda D. Foglia, Jean E. Giles & Michael E. Antonio, The Decision Maker Matters: An Empirical
Examination of the Way the Role of the Judge and the Jury Influence Death Penalty Decision-Making, 63 Wash. & Lee
L. Rev. 931 (2006) (comparing the responses of capital jurors in jury sentencing vs. hybrid states); Michael Radelet,
Overriding Jury Sentencing Recommendations in Florida Capital Cases: An Update and Possible Half-Requiem, 2011
Mich. St. L. Rev. 793, 828 (2011) (describing judicial override patterns in Florida over time); Christopher Slobogin,
The Death Penalty in Florida, 1 Elon L. Rev. 17, 47–50 (2009) (detailing problems with the majority decision rule, jury
instructions, and judicial overrides of jury recommendations in Florida).
3Woodward v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 405 (2013) (reporting Alabama jury override data and questioning whether
Alabama’s practice of capital sentencing by judges violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, or is so arbitrary
as to violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment).
4The empirical literature is substantial. See, e.g., David C. Baldus, George Woodworth & Charles A. Pulaski, Jr., Equal
Justice and the Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis (1990) (summarizing comprehensive empirical study
of Georgia’s capital sentencing); Raymond Paternoster, Robert Brame & Sarah Bacon, The Death Penalty: America’s
Experience with Capital Punishment (2007) (summary of empirical research findings); John J. Donohue III, An
Empirical Evaluation of the Connecticut Death Penalty System Since 1973: Are There Unlawful Racial, Gender, and
Geographic Disparities? 11 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 637 (2014) (summarizing comprehensive study of Connecticut’s
capital sentencing).
5Empirical research includes two previous analyses of the Delaware death penalty: Sheri Lynn Johnson, John H.
Blume, Theodore Eisenberg, Valerie P. Hans & Martin T. Wells, The Delaware Death Penalty: An Empirical Study, 97
Iowa L. Rev. 1925 (2012) (analyzing death-sentencing rates), and Caisa E. Royer, Amelia C. Hritz, Valerie P. Hans,
Theodore Eisenberg, Martin T. Wells, John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Victim Gender and the Death Penalty,
82 UMKC L. Rev. 429 (2014) (finding support for a female victim effect in Delaware capital cases). Other empirical
projects include: Ross Kleinstuber, Hegemonic Individualism and Subversive Stories in Capital Mitigation (2014)
(reporting and analyzing the results of interviews with Delaware capital jurors); Benjamin D. Fleury-Steiner, Kerry
Dunn & Ruth Fleury-Steiner, Governing Through Crime as Commonsense Racism, 11 Punishment & Soc’y 5 (2009)
(case study describing events surrounding the shift from jury to judge decision making); Glenn W. Samuelson, Why
Was Capital Punishment Restored in Delaware? 60 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 148 (1969) (analyzing homicides before
and after abolition and subsequent reinstatement of the death penalty in Delaware). See also Adam Gershowitz,
Delaware’s Capital Jury Selection: Inadequate Voir Dire and the Problem of Automatic Death Penalty Jurors, 2 Del.
L. Rev. 235 (1999) (reviewing capital litigation in Delaware).
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small size of the state and the relatively low number of homicides and individuals sentenced
to death can make it difficult to discern statistical patterns in the operation of capital
punishment. However, the low numbers also make it possible to examine in detail each
homicide case leading to a capital trial and ensuing penalty phase over the three decades
of the study period. Despite its small size, Delaware has a high death-sentencing rate relative
to other states. Death-sentencing rates are calculated by dividing the number of death
sentences by the number of homicides in a state, and Delaware has the third highest
death-sentencing rate in the United States.6
Our previous research on the Delaware death penalty has analyzed death-sentencing
rates in some detail.7 Controlling for national trends, and separating out Delaware death-
sentencing rates into judge and jury sentencing eras, the analysis found substantially higher
rates in the judge era as opposed to the jury era.8 There were also markedly higher
death-sentencing rates in Delaware capital cases with black defendants and white victims,
compared to the rates for cases with other race of defendant-race of victim combinations.9
In Delaware cases, the death-sentencing rate for black defendants who killed white victims
was six times higher than for black defendants who killed black victims, and three times
higher than for white defendants who killed black victims.10 In fact, when comparing
Delaware to other states in which there was reliable race of defendant/race of victim data,
Delaware has the highest death-sentencing rate in the country in black defendant/white
victim cases.11 A second article compared the likelihood of the death penalty in cases with
male victims as compared to female victims; the analysis showed that capital cases with
female victims were more likely to result in death sentences, even when controlling for
other case factors.12
This article significantly extends the empirical work on the operation of the death
penalty in Delaware. Our previous analysis of judge versus jury sentencing and of defendant
and victim race took the first step, combining general information from the national
homicide database with information about death sentences in Delaware and elsewhere. It
did not take into account other features of Delaware capital cases that might help explain
the death penalty decisions of judges and juries. It also did not undertake in-depth analysis
of the Delaware capital cases that ended with a decision of life imprisonment. This article
6Blume et al., supra note 2.
7Johnson et al., supra note 5.
8Id. at 1945–51.
9Id. at 1939–41.
10Id. at 1940.
11Blume et al., supra note 2.
12Royer et al., supra note 5 (finding support for a female victim effect in Delaware capital cases).
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extends our previous work by considering both life and death cases. Importantly, the article
reports analyses that control for aggravating, mitigating, and other features of the cases.
Thus, the current analysis has the potential to evaluate how the decisionmaker—judge or
jury—affects the outcome, taking multiple case factors into account.
We dedicate this article to the memory of our beloved and brilliant colleague and
friend, Theodore Eisenberg, who died before the article was completed. His co-authorship
reflects the central and substantial contributions that he made both to this article and to the
entire research project. Ted was a tireless advocate for empirical research on important
legal questions. The operation of the death penalty was one of his central concerns. Ted was
an integral part of the Cornell Death Penalty Project, and before that, the Capital Jury
Project. He provided statistical expertise and contributed his legal imagination to the
project’s scholarly endeavors, and when needed, served as an expert witness for the litiga-
tion arm of the project. His commitment to the abolition of the death penalty grew from
the data he collected and analyzed as well as the implications of those data. As his col-
leagues, we owe him (and miss him) more than we can adequately describe.
II. Historical Overview of the Death Penalty
in Delaware
A brief description of the history of the death penalty in Delaware reveals both the
legislative role in retaining the death penalty and the importance of high-profile cases in
death penalty reform. The death penalty has existed in Delaware since the early colonial
period.13 In the middle of the 20th century, there were a number of efforts to eliminate
capital punishment, which finally succeeded in 1958. Delaware became the second state,
after Missouri, to abolish the death penalty.14 In 1961, however, following the highly
publicized murder of an elderly white couple by an African-American man in southern
Delaware, the Delaware legislature reinstated capital punishment. Delaware’s Governor
Elbert Carvel vetoed the bill, but the legislature overrode his veto.15 Like most jurisdictions
at that time, Delaware’s new death penalty statute required the jury to decide the issues of
guilt and punishment in the same unitary proceeding and provided no standards for the
jury to utilize in making the life or death decision.16
13Loren C. Meyers & Gayle P. Lafferty, Capital Punishment, in Delaware Supreme Court: Golden Anniversary
1951–2001 177 (Justice Randy J. Holland & Helen L. Winslow eds., 2001).
14Herbert L. Cobin, Abolition and Restoration of the Death Penalty in Delaware, in The Death Penalty in America:
An Anthology 359, 360–64 (Hugo Adam Bedau ed., 1964); History of the Death Penalty in Delaware, <http://
www.doc.delaware.gov/deathrow/history.shtml>.
15Cobin, supra note 14, at 366–71 (offering a detailed account of the legal change); History of the Death Penalty in
Delaware, <http://www.doc.delaware.gov/deathrow/history.shtml>; Meyers & Lafferty, supra note 13; Samuelson,
supra note 5, at 148, 150–51.
16Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 3901 (1972).
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After Furman v. Georgia concluded that the death penalty, as then administered in the
United States, violated the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment,
the “mercy statute” that was a part of Delaware’s death penalty scheme was invalidated.17
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that because the mercy statute “delegates to jury
and judge uncontrolled discretion in the imposition of the death penalty . . . there is room
for that caprice, whim, and discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty that now
stands condemned by the United States Supreme Court in Furman.”18 That left a mandatory
capital punishment statute in place,19 but Delaware’s mandatory sentencing regime was
short-lived. In 1976, the Supreme Court held in Woodson v. North Carolina20 and Roberts v.
Louisiana21 that mandatory capital sentencing schemes violated the Eighth Amendment. In
State v. Spence, the Delaware Supreme Court responded to Woodson and Roberts by setting
aside all nine mandatory death sentences.22
In May 1977, the Delaware legislature enacted a new law modeled after the Georgia
capital sentencing statute upheld by the Supreme Court in 1976 in Gregg v. Georgia.23 This
scheme provided for a bifurcated trial. In the first phase, the defendant’s guilt or innocence
of first-degree murder was decided. If the defendant was convicted, the jury would then
determine the appropriate punishment in a separate penalty phase.24 The new law identi-
fied specific aggravating circumstances for the factfinder to consider in deciding on the
sentence. In the penalty phase, the system provided for the presentation of aggravating and
mitigating evidence.25 The jury could sentence the defendant to death only if it unani-
mously concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance existed, and that, by a preponderance of the evidence, after weighing all
relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation, the aggravating circumstances found to
exist outweighed the mitigating circumstances found to exist.26 The jury’s decision to
sentence the defendant to death had to be unanimous and the jury’s sentence determina-
17State v. Dickerson, 298 A.2d 761 (Del. 1973).
18Id.
19The new mandatory death penalty law represented a return to the mandatory nature of capital punishment prior to
1911. Meyers & Lafferty, supra note 13, at 177. The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the mandatory approach in State
v. Sheppard, 331 A.2d 142 (Del. 1974).
20428 U.S. 280 (1976).
21428 U.S. 325 (1976).
22367 A.2d 983, 988 (Del. 1976).
23428 U.S. 153 (1976).
24395 A.2d 1082 (Del. 1978).
25Meyers & Lafferty, supra note 13, at 181–82.
2611 Del. Code § 4209(c)(3).
74 Hans et al.
tion was binding.27 If the jury could not reach a unanimous decision on the sentence,
a life sentence was entered for the defendant. The new scheme also required the
Delaware Supreme Court to conduct an automatic review, including a proportionality
review, of each capital case.28 The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the new law in State v.
White.29
Under this statute, Delaware juries made sentencing decisions in capital cases from
1977 until 1991. As documented in more detail below, very few defendants were sentenced
to death during this period: only 11 total statewide, with most arising in Delaware’s two
southern counties, Kent and Sussex, even though homicides were much more numerous in
the northern county of New Castle. In October 1991, however, a New Castle County capital
jury decided the highly publicized case of four men from outside the state who killed two
Brooks armored car guards during a robbery.30 An interracial case with African-American
defendants and white victims, the trial garnered extensive coverage in the Wilmington,
Delaware media. All four defendants were convicted, but the jury could not agree unani-
mously on the death penalty for any of them. As the law required, they were all sentenced
to life in prison without probation or parole.31 The public was reportedly outraged at the
jury’s failure to give death sentences in the case.32 Prosecutors voiced their strong objections
to the jury trial’s outcome: “We live in a terribly jaded society if we’ve come to accept that
type of conduct without returning the death penalty.”33
Within days of the Brooks armored car verdict, and with the support of Delaware’s
then Attorney General Charles Oberly, the Delaware General Assembly passed a new bill
that amended the death penalty statute, replacing the jury with the judge as the final
decisionmaker in the penalty phase of capital trials.34 Modeled after Florida’s capital
punishment system, the new law provided that if the jury convicted of first-degree murder,
27Id.
28Id.
29395 A.2d 1082, 1097 (Del. 1978) (holding that the 1977 statute was constitutional, “except for the aggravating
circumstances identified as ‘elderly’ and ‘defenseless’ victims . . . which provisions are declared unconstitutional and
are severed from the Statute”).
30Robertson v. State, 630 A.2d 1084 (Del. 1993). For a detailed account of how the case was employed in the effort to
remove juries from capital sentencing, see Fleury-Steiner et al., supra note 5, at 11–15.
31630 A.2d at 1086.
32Floor Debate of Delaware State House, audio tape 1 (Oct. 24, 1991) (hereinafter Floor Debate, on file with author)
(identifying the case and public response to the jury’s inability to decide unanimously as the impetus for the bill). See
also Fleury-Steiner et al., supra note 5.
33Fleury-Steiner et al., supra note 5, at 14 (citing prosecutor’s statement quoted in Ted Caddell, Brooks Killers Get
Life in Jail, News J., Oct. 23, 1991, at A1).
34Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209 (1991).
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a penalty phase ensued. The jury heard aggravating and mitigating evidence presented by
the two sides, and voted on whether or not one or more statutory aggravating circumstances
existed. It also voted on whether aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circum-
stances. However, the votes no longer had to be unanimous and, more importantly, were no
longer binding on the trial judge. The judge, not the jury, was vested with ultimate
sentencing authority.35 The governor signed the bill on November 4, 1991, and it became
effective immediately.36 The new judge sentencing system was upheld by the Delaware
Supreme Court in State v. Cohen.37 Because the Delaware Supreme Court found that the
change from jury to judge sentencing was merely procedural, it concluded that the new
regime could be used in pending capital trials, even in cases where the crime occurred prior
to the enactment of the new law, making it retroactive.38
One other significant change to the death penalty sentencing scheme occurred in
2002 when the Supreme Court decided Ring v. Arizona, which applied the right to jury trial
to capital sentencing proceedings for the first time.39 In Ring, the Court held that factors
that made a defendant eligible for the death penalty, for instance, the statutory aggravating
circumstances, had to be found by a jury, unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt. At
the time of Ring, five states (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska) gave the
responsibility for death penalty decisions to judges.40 These five laws were struck down in
Ring as unconstitutional. The decision also raised the issue of the constitutionality of hybrid
sentencing approaches. Delaware was one of four states at the time (Alabama, Florida, and
Indiana being the others) with hybrid sentencing schemes in which the jury renders an
35Id.; Floor Debate, supra note 32; see also Meyers & Lafferty, supra note 13, at 185; State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846 (Del.
1992).
36Meyers & Lafferty, supra note 13, at 185.
37State v. Cohen, 604 A.2d 846 (Del. 1992).
38In six of the seven cases combined in State v. Cohen, the murders had occurred before the 1991 amendments were
passed into legislation.
39536 U.S. 584 (2002). The Court had previously rejected claims that jury participation in the capital sentencing
process was required by the Sixth Amendment in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S, 639 (1990). Subsequent to Walton,
however, in a line of noncapital sentencing cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the
Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial requires that juries—not judges—find facts that enhance a
sentence beyond the statutory maximum punishment. The Court applied this new line of cases to the capital
sentencing in Ring. Because it is the finding of an aggravating circumstance that (potentially) enhances a defendant’s
punishment and makes him (or her) “eligible” for the death penalty, juries must decide the existence vel non of
aggravating circumstances. The Court did not mandate, however, that the juries make the punishment decision, that
is, that juries determine whether the death penalty is the appropriate punishment in a particular case, taking into
account all of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
40In Ring, 536 U.S. 584 n.6, Justice Ginsburg identified five states in which the fact finding and capital decision making
was entirely the responsibility of judges. In addition to Arizona, the opinion listed these states as Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, and Nebraska. See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-11-103 (2001) (decision made by three-judge panel); Idaho Code
§ 19-2515 (Supp. 2001); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-18-301 (1997); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2520 (1995).
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advisory verdict but the judge makes the ultimate sentencing determination. The constitu-
tionality of this scheme was now open to question.41
States responded to Ring in different ways, with some judge sentencing states moving
to jury sentencing and others adopting a hybrid approach in which the jury made the
required determination of the presence of an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable
doubt, but the judge retained the ultimate sentencing decision in those cases where the jury
found an aggravating factor.42
Delaware chose the latter approach. Delaware’s legislature retained the judge as the
final sentencer, and the jury’s vote on whether aggravating circumstances outweigh miti-
gating circumstances is still only advisory to the judge. But to comply with Ring, the new law
required that a jury must find at least one statutory aggravating factor unanimously and
beyond a reasonable doubt.43 Moreover, although the ultimate sentencing power still
resides with the judge, the trial judge must give “appropriate consideration” to a jury’s
decision about whether the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circum-
stances.44 Initially, the Delaware Supreme Court interpreted the statute as requiring judges
to give the jury’s recommendation “great weight.”45 However, in response to the Sadiki
Garden case discussed below, in which the Delaware Supreme Court overturned a judge’s
death sentence in a case in which the majority of the jurors had recommended life, the
Delaware legislature modified the language in the statute, with judges only needing to give
the jury’s recommendation whatever consideration the judge deemed appropriate.46
The jury has a somewhat larger role in the hybrid model than in the judge sentencing
approach that prevailed from 1991 through 2002, though less of a role than in the system
prevailing from 1977 to 1991. Some might consider the necessity of the jury’s arriving at a
unanimous opinion about the presence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reason-
able doubt to be insignificant as a practical matter. The list of statutory aggravators is a long
one, and most first-degree murder cases include patently obvious aggravation. However, the
41Ring also identified the four states with hybrid systems as Alabama, Delaware, Florida, and Indiana. See Ala. Code
§§ 13A-5-46, 13A-5-47 (1994); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 921.141 (West 2001); Ind. Code
Ann. § 35-50-2-9 (Supp. 2001).
42Marc R. Shapiro, Reevaluating the Role of the Jury in Capital Sentencing after Ring v. Arizona, 59 NYU L. Rev. 633
(2004).
43Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209 (2002).
44Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209(d)(1) (“The jury’s recommendation concerning whether the aggravating circum-
stances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist shall be given such consideration as
deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense
and the character and propensities of the offender as found to exist by the Court.”) (bold emphasis added).
45Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 342 (Del. 2003) (remanding where Superior Court judge gave substantial consid-
eration to the jury’s recommendation of life, but imposed a sentence of death); Garden v. State, 844 A.2d 311 (Del.
2004) (remanding where a Superior Court judge failed to give “great weight” to the jury’s recommendation of life,
and where the jury’s recommendation of life was supportable).
46Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, § 4209.
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new legal requirement resulted in the setting aside of a high-profile defendant’s death
sentence. Thomas Capano, a wealthy and politically connected lawyer, was convicted by a
New Castle County jury of the murder of his former mistress, whose body he dumped at sea.
His widely publicized capital trial began in 1998, during the judge sentencing regime. The
trial judge sentenced Capano to death, but the jury’s vote on whether an aggravating
circumstance existed in his case was a nonunanimous 11–1.47 The Delaware Supreme Court
set aside his death sentence on Ring grounds, remanding it for a new penalty hearing.48
However, the Attorney General declined to pursue a second penalty phase hearing for
Capano.49
In one sense, all the approaches that Delaware has taken to capital sentencing might
be fairly characterized as hybrid in that both judge and jury are involved in the capital trial
and play significant roles. However, the sentencing regimes can be distinguished in the
importance they place on each factfinder and the binding nature of the decisions by the
jury and the judge. The question is whether these different roles make a difference in
the outcomes of capital cases.
A. Judge Versus Jury Sentencing: Should it Make a Difference?
What is the evidence that judges are more likely than juries to impose death sentences?
Delaware’s move from jury to judge sentencing in capital cases was motivated by the
perception that juries were less likely than judges to give death sentences in appropriate
cases. Speaking to the local press around the time of Delaware’s legislative debate, House
Speaker Terry Spence asserted: “Elected officials are tired of these juries that don’t impose
the death penalty.”50 About other states, Marc Shapiro writes: “State rationales for excluding
juries at the sentencing phase varied. Prosecutors in Colorado argued that the implemen-
tation of a three-judge system would help increase the number of death sentences handed
down in the state by “tak[ing] sentencing in death penalty cases away from jurors . . .
[because they] were ‘too soft’ to vote for death sentences in even the most heinous cases.”51
In contrast, Arizona and Florida maintained that judges were better suited to the serious
47Michael Janofsky, Death Penalty for Killing of Mistress, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1999.
48The Delaware Supreme Court wrote that it found “a constitutional flaw in its application to [Capano] under the new
rule announced by the United States Supreme Court in Ring. A factual determination of eligibility for the death
penalty must be found by a jury because under Ring, eligibility based upon the existence of a statutory aggravating
circumstance is no longer merely a sentencing factor but, rather, is an element of the greater offense of capital
murder. In Delaware, the elements of any criminal offense, including the greater offense of capital murder, must be
found by a unanimous jury. Because Capano’s eligibility for the death penalty was decided by the sentencing judge
without a unanimous jury finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance, we must vacate his death sentence.” Capano
v. State, 889 A.2d 968, 973 (Del. 2006).
49Capano died of natural causes in prison while serving his life sentence. Larry King, Convicted Delaware Killer
Capano Dies in Prison, Sept. 19, 2011, <phillynews.com>.
50Bill Would Let Judges Decide Death Penalty, New Orleans Times Picayune, Oct. 26, 1991, at A4.
51Shapiro, supra note 42, at 639.
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assessment of whether a defendant should receive the death penalty, that juries were more
apt to be influenced by emotion, and that a judicially dominated system would limit the
number of death sentences.52
What does previous research suggest about jury tendencies in sentencing as com-
pared to those of judges? Jury sentencing in the United States is mostly limited to the capital
punishment context. In other countries, professional and lay judges commonly decide on
both guilt and sentence collaboratively, and studies generally find substantial overlap
between professional and lay judges in both verdict and sentencing.53 Nancy King reports,
however, that in the handful of states with felony jury sentencing, prosecutors have suc-
cessfully employed the specter of punitive and unpredictable juries to encourage felony
defendant plea bargains.54 In some of these states, juries are given little or no guidance
about the typical sentences for felonies. As a result, jury sentences may be more variable
(and possibly lengthier) than judicial sentences.
One body of work directly compares judges with juries: the judge-jury verdict agree-
ment studies. That research shows substantial overlap in evaluation of evidence and the
verdicts reached by judges and juries in criminal trials.55 Research by Chris Guthrie, Andrew
Martin, and Jeffrey Rachlinski has discovered that U.S. judges rely on many of the same
heuristics and other cognitive shortcuts as people who do not have legal training.56 Thus
judges and juries are likely to overlap substantially in their errors in decision making.
However, to the extent judges and juries differ, the judge-jury verdict agreement studies
reveal that the judge is more inclined than the jury to convict the defendant. Juries seem to
demand more evidence to convict than do judges, and also appear to interpret “beyond a
reasonable doubt” more generously than do judges.57
52Id.
53World Jury Systems (Neil Vidmar ed., 2000) (describing use of lay and professional judge decision making about
guilt and sentencing in other countries); Valerie P. Hans, Jury Systems Around the World, 4 Ann. Rev. L. & Soc. Sci.
275 (2008) (describing use of lay and professional judge decision making about guilt and sentencing in other
countries).
54Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 885
(2004) (analyzing jury sentencing in three states).
55See Neil Vidmar & Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 148–51 (2007). See also the discussions in
Theodore Eisenberg, Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Waters, G. Thomas Munsterman, Stewart
J. Schwab & Martin T. Wells, Judge-Jury Agreement in Criminal Cases: A Partial Replication of Kalven & Zeisel’s The
American Jury, 2 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 171 (2005); Valerie P. Hans, What Difference Does a Jury Make? 3 Yonsei
L.J. 36 (2012); Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J. L. & Pol’y 19 (2007); Valerie P. Hans,
Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Nicole L. Mott & G. Thomas Munsterman, The Hung Jury: The American Jury’s Insights
and Contemporary Understanding, 39 Crim. L. Bull. 33 (2003).
56Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 Cornell. L. Rev. 777 (2001);
Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 Cornell
L. Rev. 1 (2007).
57Eisenberg et al., supra note 55, at 194–96.
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However, these generalizations must be regarded with caution when applied to
capital cases. Juries in capital cases must be “death-qualified.”58 Thus, in theory, potential
jurors who would never or always give a death sentence are not eligible to serve.59 Empirical
studies reveal that compared to the general public, death-qualified juries are more
conviction-prone, more supportive of prosecutors’ arguments, and more suspicious of
defense attorneys and their arguments.60 They are also more reluctant to support some
types of evidence and arguments such as insanity defense claims.61 On the basis of these
studies, one might expect that the process of death qualification would produce juries that
are more punitive than judges, but the work on death qualification has typically not
compared death-qualified juries to judges.
Studies have also discovered that many capital jurors report deciding on the punish-
ment during the guilt phase of the capital trial.62 They are often skeptical of mitigation
arguments, and have difficulty understanding the complex jury instructions in capital
penalty trials, including the all-important distinction between aggravating and mitigating
factors.63 Moreover, both examination of capital sentencing decisions and mock jury studies
suggest that juries in capital cases are influenced by race, including both the race of the
defendant and the race of the victim.64
Looking more directly at state practices of capital decision making in the United
States, evidence suggests that a jury capital sentencing regime may be more favorable to
58Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
59Id.; Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985). We say “in theory” advisedly because the empirical evidence suggests
that significant numbers of jurors who actually serve in capital cases are what are referred to in death penalty parlance
as ADP (automatic death penalty) jurors. John H. Blume, Sheri L. Johnson & A. Brian Threlkeld, Probing “Life
Qualification” Through Expanded Voir Dire, 29 Hofstra L. Rev. 1209, 1220 (2001). An analysis of Capital Jury Project
data, for example, revealed that between 14 percent and 30 percent of jurors in some states would always vote for the
death penalty in cases where the defendant was found guilty of capital murder. Id. at 1222–23. And substantially more
jurors believed that the law “required” them to impose the death penalty if the crime was “heinous or depraved.” Id.
Given that all of these jurors had been through the death qualification voir dire and determined by a judge to be
agnostic in the abstract on whether the death penalty was always or never appropriate, we are less than sanguine on
the effectiveness of the process.
60Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Raymond M. Bukaty, Claudia L. Cowan & William C. Thompson, The Death-Qualified Jury and
the Defense of Insanity, 8 Law & Hum. Behav. 8 (1984).
61Id.
62Bowers et al., supra note 2.
63See Theodore Eisenberg & Martin Wells, Deadly Confusion: Juror Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 Cornell L. Rev.
1 (1993); Vidmar & Hans, supra note 55, at 260–62.
64David C. Baldus, George Woodworth, David Zuckerman, Neil Alan Weiner & Barbara Broffitt, Racial Discrimination
and the Death Penalty in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from
Philadelphia, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1638 (1997); John H. Blume, Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Post-
McCleskey Racial Discrimination Claims in Capital Cases, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1771 (1997); Sheri Lynn Johnson,
Litigation for Racial Fairness After McCleskey v. Kemp, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 178 (2007); Laura Sweeney & Craig
Haney, The Influence of Race on Sentencing: A Meta-Analytic Review of Experimental Studies, 10 Behav. Sci. & L. 179
(1992).
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defendants than a judge sentencing approach. The frequency of judicial life-to-death
overrides in hybrid states constitutes the strongest evidence. There is striking asymmetry
that works to the disadvantage of capital defendants in judge sentencing cases. Justice
Sotomayor’s opinion in Woodward reported that 95 Alabama defendants were sentenced to
death by judges after juries in their cases recommended life imprisonment, in contrast to
nine cases in which judges imposed life after juries recommended a death sentence.65 In
Florida, where the jury also makes an advisory recommendation to the judge, who has the
final say, Michael Radelet reports that judges have overridden jury recommendations for
life to impose death 166 times.66 Radelet points out, however, that these data may not reflect
current differences between Florida judges and juries, as the last life-to-death override in
Florida occurred in 1999.67
In addition to the fact of asymmetrical judicial overrides of jury life recommenda-
tions, Capital Jury Project researchers have observed another problem with hybrid sentenc-
ing systems in which judge and jury share the decision making.68 Their posttrial interviews
with capital jurors revealed that when their decision was only advisory, jurors felt less
responsible for the sentencing decision, and they reported deliberating more quickly and
less thoroughly, compared to jurors whose decision was binding.69
Thus, previous research offers a mixed picture. Some work raises concerns about the
fairness and competence of death-qualified jurors. The judge-jury agreement studies
suggest there is likely to be substantial overlap in judge and jury decisions, with judges
tending to be harsher than juries when they disagree. Of course, even if jury sentencing may
be more favorable to defendants in certain cases, there are other cases, perhaps those with
highly unpopular defendants, or those involving mental illness or intellectual disability
defenses, in which judicial determinations might be more favorable to defendants.70
65Woodward v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 405 n.1 (2013). Sotomayor’s opinion updated with recent cases an original report
by the Equal Justice Institute, which stated: “Since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, Alabama judges have
overridden 84 cases from life to death. In the same period, judges overruled death verdicts to life sentences in only
a handful of cases. Of the 198 prisoners currently on Alabama’s death row, 40 (20%) were condemned to death by
a judge who threw out the jury’s decision that death was not the appropriate punishment.” Equal Justice Institute,
Judicial Override Fact Sheet, <www.eji.org/. . ./03.19.08%20Judicial%20Override%20Fact%20Sheet_0.pdf>. See also
<http://www.eji.org/eji/deathpenalty/override> for a general discussion of judicial overrides in Alabama.
66Woodward v. Alabama, 571 U.S. 405, 408 n.6 (2013); Radelet, Overriding Jury Sentencing Recommendations, supra
note 2.
67Id.
68Bowers et al., supra note 2.
69Id. at 954–60 (jurors in hybrid states felt less responsible than jurors in states in which their decision was binding);
973–77 (finding that jurors in hybrid states deliberated more rapidly, compared to states in which they made binding
decisions).
70John H. Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Paul Marcus & Emily Paavola, A Tale of Two Atkins: Intellectual Disability and
Capital Punishment Twelve Years After the Supreme Court’s Creation of a Categorical Bar, ___ Wm. & Mary Bill Rts.
J. ___ (forthcoming 2014) (finding that jury determination of intellectual disability was less favorable than that of
judges by several magnitudes); Leona D. Jochnowitz, How Capital Jurors Respond to Mitigating Evidence of
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III. Methodology
A. The Delaware Capital Trials Data Set
The Delaware Capital Trials data set includes information from capital cases in Delaware
during the modern era of capital punishment, beginning in 1977.71 Most cases in the data
set concluded by 2007, although there are a handful that extend beyond that date. Infor-
mation was compiled from legal and other documents in the homicide case files in the
offices of the Delaware Prothonotary and in the Delaware Archives.
We wish to highlight three features of the data set. First, it includes only those cases
in which a capital trial proceeded to a sentencing hearing. Prosecutorial decisions to charge
capitally are not the central object of study, although those decisions are reflected in the
pool of capital trials that the decisionmaker considers. Second, because of Delaware’s
unique history, the data set includes sentencing decisions by both juries and judges. Finally,
we are able to consider case outcomes across Attorneys General regimes and across Del-
aware’s three counties, controlling for other differences in the cases.
The database contains information from 146 capital cases that reached the sentenc-
ing phase in Delaware between 1977 and 2007. Cases were identified as meriting inclusion
using the filing system of the Prothonotary’s offices and by relying on other summaries of
capital cases, including listings by the Delaware Supreme Court and the Office of the Public
Defender. Nonetheless, it is conceivable that some Delaware capital cases that resulted in
life imprisonment are not included in the database.
Trained coders created the database from information included in Superior Court
files in the Delaware Archives and Prothonotary’s offices in all three Delaware counties. A
detailed questionnaire was used to code over 700 elements of the case, including informa-
tion about the crime, defendants, and victims.72 Information about the cases was sup-
plemented by other sources, including Delaware trial and appellate court opinions,
Third Circuit and U.S. Supreme Court opinions, news reports, law review articles, and
Delaware judges and attorneys. The case files vary in their completeness. The case files
sometimes lacked detailed information about elements of the underlying crimes, what was
presented at trial, and what factors were considered in the penalty phases of the trials.73 The
Defendant’s Mental Illness, Retardation and Situational Impairments: An Analysis of the Legal and Social Science
Literature, 47 Crim. L. Bull. 839 (2011) (review of literature regarding jurors’ responses to mental illness, intellectual
disabilities, and situational impairments as mitigating factors); Amelia C. Hritz, Intellectual Disabilities: Judge, Jury
and Executioner? unpublished manuscript, Cornell Law School (2014) (review of literature examining judge and jury
decision making regarding claims of intellectual disability in capital cases).
71Johnson et al., supra note 5.
72The questionnaire was adapted from one created by David Baldus and his collaborators; see Baldus et al., supra note
4, at 512–48.
73Despite dogged efforts to collect complete information on these cases, reliance on multiple sources, and excellent
cooperation from the Delaware Superior Court and the Prothonotary’s offices, some files have significant missing
information. The variables in the regression equations, however, are based on largely complete information.
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variables included in the regression analyses for the 146 cases, however, are largely com-
plete, with the exception of potentially mitigating factors. Information about the specific
mitigation that was presented, especially in penalty phase hearings that ended with a life
verdict, was sometimes lacking.
The database includes basic information about the case, background information
about the defendant and the victim, presence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances,
and demographic information about the victim and the defendant. In addition to analyzing
these factors, several scales tapped potential defendant, victim, and case characteristics that
might influence punishment decisions. In cases with multiple victims, the race, gender, and
other characteristics of the primary victim were employed in regression analyses.
The statutory aggravating factors scale was designed to assess how many statutory
aggravators the crime contained. The scale was made by adding together the crime and
defendant characteristics that were identified as potentially aggravating factors in Del-
aware’s capital punishment statute.74 These factors include whether the murder was com-
mitted against a person held as a shield or hostage, whether the crime involved the death
of multiple victims, whether the defendant was previously convicted of another murder/
manslaughter/felony involving violence, whether the murder was committed during the
defendant’s engagement in another crime, and other items. For each aggravating factor
that was suggested or explicitly stated in the case file, the case received a point on the
statutory aggravators scale.75 It is worth noting that in contrast to the practice of many other
states, Delaware judges and juries are not limited to the list of statutory aggravators in their
overall consideration of the deathworthiness of the case. Attorneys may argue and
factfinders may take both statutory and nonstatutory aggravating factors into account in
making the sentencing decision.
The heinousness scale was modeled after a scale used by Phillips and colleagues.76
Although the initial scale created by Phillips included the number of aggravating factors in
a case minus the number of mitigating factors in a case, the heinousness scale developed for
this study only looked at potential aggravators and excluded factors already included in the
statutory aggravating factors scale. The scale was designed to provide additional informa-
tion about aggravating features of the case, beyond the statutory aggravating factors scale
that was designed to look at the legislatively identified aggravating factors in a case. The
heinousness scale combined a number of items, including whether the defendant con-
tinued a painful attack after it was apparent the victim was dying, whether the victim was
bound or gagged, and whether the victim pleaded for his or her life. For each relevant
74See 59 Del. Laws 943 (1974) (codified as amended at Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 636, 4209 (2011)).
75Each relevant item that is present in a case (and that was identified as a statutory aggravator at the time of the
defendant’s trial) adds one point to the case’s scale score. We recognize that some items may have been more
influential to the sentencer than others. Nonetheless, our scales are designed to compare the total aggregate number
of items across cases. Scores on the statutory aggravating factors scale ranged from 0 to 8 (M = 2.59, SD = 1.29).
76Scott Phillips, Laura P. Haas & James E. Coverdill, Disentangling Victim Gender and Capital Punishment: The Role
of Media, 7 Feminist Criminology 136 (2012).
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factor that was suggested or expressly stated in the case file, the case received a point on the
heinousness scale.77
The mitigating factors scale was designed to assess how many mitigating factors the
crime contained. The scale was made from an aggregate of a number of crime and
defendant characteristics identified in the Baldus study, and by other researchers, as
potentially mitigating factors.78 The scale included items such as an absence of prior
criminal activity, whether the victim consented to the defendant’s conduct, and whether
the defendant expressed remorse for the crime. For each mitigating factor that was sug-
gested or explicitly stated in the case file, the case received a point on the mitigating factors
scale.79
B. Supplemental Homicide Reports
To provide a measure of death penalty seeking and to assess whether and how it varied by
sentencing era, one set of analyses employed the FBI’s Supplementary Homicide Reports
(SHR) for the State of Delaware.80 The FBI’s SHR contains information on the vast majority
of murders in the United States.81 For each murder, the data include the year of the offense,
the race, sex, and age of both the victim and the defendant arrested for the offense, the
county in which the offense occurred, and information about the nature of the murder,
including whether it was committed in the course of certain crimes such as robbery, rape,
burglary, or larceny.82 Two reports indicate that there was some underreporting of Dela-
ware homicides in the SHR data during the three decades of our study period.83 However,
77Scores on the heinousness scale ranged from 0 to 12 (M = 3.06, SD = 2.24).
7859 Del. Laws 943 (1974) (codified as amended at Del. Code Ann. tit. 11, §§ 636, 4209 (2011)) does not specifically
list potentially mitigating factors; instead, the decisionmaker may take any mitigating factors into account.
79Scores on the mitigating factors scale ranged from 0 to 10 (M = 3.35, SD = 2.30).
80James A. Fox & Marc L. Swatt, Uniform Crime Reports [United States]: Supplementary Homicide Reports, with
Multiple Imputation, Cumulative Files 1976–2007 (2000), available at <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/
NACJD/studies/24801>.
81Id.
82Id. For a discussion of the SHR data quality, see generally James Alan Fox & Marc L. Swatt, Multiple Imputation of
the Supplementary Homicide Reports, 1976–2005, 25 J. Quantitative Criminology 51 (2009).
83We located two relevant assessments of the completeness of Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) that presented separate
information about Delaware. First, a government report identified some missing UCR data from Delaware in 1995,
but concluded: “Aside from occasional lapses, Delaware’s UCR reporting has been consistently strong.” Michael D.
Maltz, Bridging Gaps in Police Crime Data 7 (Discussion Paper, BJS Fellows Program, National Institute of Justice,
1999). An unpublished Ph.D. thesis also identified some missing UCR data in Delaware during the early 1990s. Joseph
Robert Targonski, A Comparison of Imputation Methodologies in the Offenses-Known Uniform Crime Reports 105
(Ph.D. thesis, University of Illinois at Chicago, 2011). We include this information in the present article so that
readers can take the information into account as they consider our results. We used nonimputed data only in the two
analyses that employ SHR homicide rates. In analyses not reported here, however, we conducted the same analyses
with imputed data, and there were no meaningful differences.
84 Hans et al.
crime analysts have concluded that despite some imperfections, the murder data are among
the most reliable crime data.84 We treated a case that did not include the offender’s sex as
unsolved and removed the case from the death sentence rate calculations.85
IV. Results
Of the 146 cases that were death-penalty eligible and reached the sentencing phase of a
capital trial, 54 resulted in a death sentence. As Figure 1 shows, whether a case resulted in
a death sentence was strongly influenced by whether the punishment was decided during
the judge or jury eras. Judges were significantly more likely to give a defendant the death
sentence than were juries.86 Figure 1 shows that of the 57 cases decided during the jury era,
84See John J. Donohue, Understanding the Time Path of Crime, 88 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 1423, 1425 (1998); John
J. Donohue & Peter Siegelman, Allocating Resources Among Prisons and Social Programs in the Battle Against Crime,
27 J. Legal Stud. 1, 14 (1998); Robert J. Cottrol, Hard Choices and Shifted Burdens: American Crime and American
Justice at the End of the Century, 65 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 506, 517 (1997) (book review). But see Michael Maxfield,
Circumstances in Supplementary Homicide Reports: Variety and Validity, 27 Criminology 671, 675–81 (1989). The
data exclude negligent manslaughters and justifiable homicides. Fox & Swatt, supra note 82, at 60.
85Missing data for unsolved murders are not a concern for this study because unsolved murders do not produce
candidates for death row.
86Judges were more likely than juries to sentence a defendant to death, X2 (1, N = 144) = 13.28, p < 0.001.
Figure 1: Percentage of life and death sentences during each era (n = 146).
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Note: The figure displays the percentage of Delaware capital trials that resulted in death sentences within each sentencing era.
These include 57 jury era cases, 58 cases in the first judge era, and 31 cases in the hybrid judge-jury era.
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only eleven (19 percent) received death sentences (including one death sentence by a
judge). Decisions made during the judge era were nearly evenly split, with 31 (53 percent)
cases receiving death sentences and 27 (47 percent) receiving life sentences. The post-Ring
hybrid sentencing scheme fell in between, with 39 percent of cases resulting in death
sentences.
A. External Factors Explaining Judge and Jury Differences
Because the sentencing eras in Delaware occurred during different time periods, and other
factors relevant to the criminal justice system such as crime rates or prosecutorial decisions
may also have varied across these time periods, it is prudent to examine, to the extent we
can determine, whether relevant external factors varied and might be driving the observed
judge-jury differences in sentencing.
B. Crime Rates
One possible explanation of the judge-jury differences in death sentencing is that the crime
rates differed in these eras. Judges could sentence more people to death in response to
greater numbers of murders and increased public concern about crime in a particular time
period. To investigate this possibility, SHR data were used to calculate the proportion of
death sentences per reported homicides in each of the eras, which controls for the overall
number of homicides in any one era. The results, shown in Figure 2, confirm that judges
give proportionately more death sentences than juries. The highest proportion is for
homicides occurring during the first judge era (between 1992 and 2001) in which 13
Figure 2: Death-sentencing rates in Delaware homicides by sentencing era.
Note: The figure displays the percentage of death sentences per homicide within each sentencing era in Delaware.
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percent of the homicides resulted in a death sentence at trial. The lowest proportion is for
homicides occurring during the jury era (between 1977 and 1991), in which 2 percent of
the homicides led to a death sentence at trial. The proportion for homicides occurring
between 2002 and 2007 fell in between the other two eras at 5 percent.
C. Case Selection
Another possible explanation for judge-jury differences in sentencing is that prosecutors
were more selective in the cases they brought before judges, and thus judges saw more
aggravated cases. To determine if the cases brought before judges were more selective,
homicide data from the SHR were used to calculate death-seeking rates. We used the
existence of a case in our database as evidence that the death penalty was sought.
This likely understates prosecutors’ pursuit of the death penalty because cases that
were charged capitally but that did not result in a capital murder conviction and a subse-
quent penalty trial were not included in our database. There are many reasons a case may
not have reached the penalty phase and thus was not included in our study. The homicide
case may have concluded in a plea bargain. The defendant may have been acquitted, found
guilty of a lesser-included offense for which the death penalty was not a legally permissible
punishment, or been acquitted of a related offense that was the death-eligible statutory
aggravating circumstance.
For both the Delaware SHR homicide data and the Delaware Capital Trials data, we
calculated the numbers for each sentencing era separately to assess whether prosecutors
sought death differentially across the eras. Results indicated that they did. Figure 3 displays,
for time periods corresponding to each sentencing era, the percentage of homicides that
resulted in a capital trial with a penalty phase hearing.
Figure 3: Death-seeking rates in Delaware homicides by sentencing era.
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Figure 3 reveals that the death penalty was sought the most during the first judge era
and the least during the jury era. During the first judge era, approximately a quarter of the
Delaware homicides resulted in a capital trial that reached the penalty phase. In contrast,
13 percent of cases during the hybrid era and just 12 percent of the cases during the jury
era led to a capital trial that reached the penalty phase. Thus, considering the overall
pattern of homicides in Delaware, we see that the death penalty was sought less often when
juries decided the sentences. This suggests that the cases brought before judges were not
more selective and in fact were less selective than cases brought before juries.
Attorneys General differed in the number of capital trials they pursued during their
terms of office, as shown in Appendix 1. The greatest number of capital trials and death
sentences occurred during the terms of Democrat Charles Oberly and Republican Jane
Brady. This is not surprising given their long tenures (12 and 10 years, respectively). Both
Oberly’s and Brady’s periods of service bridged the eras. About half the capital trials Oberly
and Brady pursued during the first judge era resulted in death sentences, with lower
proportions of death sentences in the jury era for Oberly and in the hybrid era for Brady.
D. Case Differences Impacting Death Sentences: Logistic Regression Analyses
The death-seeking rate differences described previously indicate that the cases brought
before judges were not more selective than the cases brought before juries. Another
possible explanation for the judge and jury differences is that there were different types of
crime during the different eras. For example, if murders associated with drug trafficking
were more common during the judge era, there might have been a greater proportion of
murders that were particularly heinous and included additional felonies. To test this
possibility, we considered whether there were significant differences in the cases during the
different sentencing eras that may be related to sentencing outcomes at trial. Therefore, we
estimated multiple logistic regression models predicting the likelihood of a defendant
receiving a death sentence.
Descriptive statistics separated by sentencing era for all variables used in the analyses
are reported in Table 1, including statistics for both the total sample and the cases resulting
in a death sentence.
Of the 146 cases in the database, 43 different judges presided over the trials.87 While
many of the judges only presided over one case, several presided over multiple cases, with
a range from 1 to 13. Generalized logistic regression models were used with robust standard
errors clustered by the sentencing judge to correct the variance estimates due to the
87Information about the identity of the sentencing judge in 10 of the 146 trials was missing. For the purposes of the
regression analyses, each of these cases was treated as having a unique judge, which is included in the total number
of 43 judges.
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presence of conditional dependence from the multiple cases with the same judge in our
data set. The modest number of cases in the database meant that the number of predictor
variables that we were able to consider simultaneously was limited. Table 2 displays the
estimates of the raw scores of the predictor variables on sentence and standard errors.
The first model in Table 2 (Model 1, All Cases) included all of the 146 cases in our
data set. Instead of comparing across the three eras, this analysis looked at who made the
sentencing decision (judge or jury). We also employed a small number of theoretically
important predictor variables, including the sentencer (judge vs. jury), aggravating and
mitigating factors, heinousness, whether the murder was committed by a stranger or
nonstranger, and the county of the murder. We chose these variables based on theory and
prior research about the factors that influence capital sentencing, and variables for which
there was minimal missing data.
We examined the goodness of fit of the models using the c -statistic. The c -statistic is
routinely used to compare the goodness of fit of logistic regression models; values for this
measure range from 0.5 to 1.0. A value of 0.5 indicates that the model is no better than
chance at making a prediction of classification to a group and a value of 1.0 indicates that
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Variables (N = 146)
Variable
Jury Era Judge Era Hybrid Era
n (%) n (%) n (%)
Sentence
Life 46 (80.7) 27 (46.6) 19 (61.3)
Death 11 (19.3) 31 (53.4) 12 (38.7)
Victim Gender
Male 33 (57.9) 39 (67.2) 23 (74.2)
Female 24 (42.1) 19 (32.8) 8 (25.8)
Victim Race
White 45 (78.9) 33 (56.9) 14 (45.2)
Nonwhite 12 (21.1) 25 (43.1) 17 (54.8)
Defendant Race
White 27 (47.4) 22 (37.9) 5 (16.1)
Nonwhite 30 (52.6) 36 (62.1) 26 (83.9)
Victim-Defendant Relationship
Paramour 9 (15.8) 10 (17.2) 5 (16.1)
Family, friend, or neighbor 7 (12.3) 12 (20.7) 4 (12.9)
Rival or acquaintance 20 (35.1) 10 (17.2) 12 (38.7)
Stranger 21 (36.8) 26 (44.8) 10 (32.3)
Scale M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Statutory aggravating factors 1.65 (1.27) 1.91 (1.06) 1.45 (1.06)
2.18 (1.17) 2.13 (1.02) 1.92 (1.44)
Statutory mitigating factors 1.42 (1.78) 5.79 (2.85) 5.87 (3.77)
1.73 (2.14) 6.23 (2.32) 5.83 (4.51)
Heinousness 2.61 (1.81) 2.50 (1.88) 2.61 (1.94)
2.91 (2.38) 3.13 (2.00) 3.08 (2.31)
Note: Numbers in bold are cases that resulted in a death sentence.
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the model perfectly identifies those within a group and those not. Model fits are typically
considered strong when the c -statistic exceeds 0.8, as is the case in five of the nine models.88
Considering all the predictor variables in Table 2’s Model 1, All Cases, whether
judges or juries were the sentencers was one of the most powerful influences on the
likelihood of a death sentence. Judges were significantly more likely to sentence defendants
to death than were juries, even controlling for the amount of aggravation and mitigation in
the case. Indeed, the impact of judge sentencing exceeded the impact of these legally
relevant variables. Homicides with a greater number of statutory aggravating factors, homi-
cides between strangers, and homicides that took place in Kent County (vs. New Castle and
Sussex counties) were also significantly more likely to result in a death sentence. Homicides
that were more heinous were marginally more likely to result in a death penalty as well.
In the next two models in Table 2 (Model 1, Judge Cases, and Model 1, Jury Cases),
we examined separately the impact of our predictors for sentences decided either by judges
or by juries. There are slight differences between the number of cases in the jury era and
the number of cases decided by a jury because in one case during the jury era, the
sentencing decision was made by a judge. Thus, these analyses include 90 judge cases and
56 jury cases. The modest number of cases in the separate Model 1, Judge Cases and Model
1, Jury Cases makes it more difficult to detect statistically significant patterns. Nonetheless,
the side-by-side comparison offers an opportunity to see whether the same or different
factors predict the sentences reached by these different decisionmakers.
Across Table 2, examining the patterns in judge and jury decided cases, one can
observe a fair amount of overlap in the way in which many of the factors appear to influence
decision making by judges and juries. Even when the relationships between predictor
variables and death sentences are not significant, they often move in the same direction for
judge and jury cases. For instance, comparing Model 1’s judge and jury cases, we see that
aggravating factors similarly increased the likelihood of a death sentence for both judges
and juries.
However, there were some noteworthy differences. Heinousness of the crime led to
more death sentences in judge cases but not in jury cases. There were also striking differ-
ences between judge and jury by the county of the homicide, as reflected in the statistically
significant interaction between the county of the homicide and the sentencer. For jury
decided cases, there were strong county differences, such that murders in Kent County were
much more likely to result in death sentences than were those that occurred in the other
two Delaware counties, even controlling for the legally relevant factors. When judges made
the binding decision, there was no county effect.
The Model 2 columns of Table 2 retained the sentencer and county, but replaced the
other predictor variables with the race of the defendant, race of the victim, the interaction
between defendant race and victim race, and the gender of the victim. These analyses
allowed us to look separately at the effects of the characteristics of the victim and the
defendant on the likelihood of death sentences in Delaware. The Model 2, All Cases
regression analysis showed that both sentencer and county remained statistically significant.
88David W. Hosmer & Stanley Lemeshow, Applied Logistic Regression (2d ed. 2000).
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In addition, defendants who killed female victims were significantly more likely to receive
the death penalty. In Model 2, Judge Cases and Model 2, Jury Cases one can observe both
similarity and divergence. Female victim cases lead to more death sentences, although it is
marginal in the judge cases and statistically significant in the jury cases.
The Model 3 regressions in Table 2 combined all the variables in one analysis. A
number of the factors found to predict death sentences in Models 1 and 2 remained
statistically significant predictors. For the Model 3, All Cases regression, whether a judge or
jury sentences, the number of statutory aggravating factors, stranger cases, female victim
cases, and the county in which the murder occurred were all statistically significant predictors
of death sentences. For the Model 3, Judge Cases, statutory aggravating factors significantly
increased and heinousness marginally increased the likelihood of a death sentence. Within
cases decided by juries (Model 3, Jury Cases), death sentences were significantly more likely
with a greater number of statutory aggravating factors, when the homicide occurred between
strangers, in female victim cases, and when the homicide occurred in Kent County.
Two other factors in Model 3, Jury Cases deserve mention. One is heinousness, the
characteristics of a case, such as a lengthy attack or gagging a victim, that fall outside the list
of statutory aggravators but should increase the likelihood of a death sentence. The
negative relationship indicates that even juries in the most heinous cases were inclined to
give life sentences. By way of illustration, the case of serial killer Steven Pennell was assessed
as the most heinous in the database, but the jury could not agree unanimously on a death
sentence. In a subsequent trial, Pennell waived his right to a jury and a judge gave him a
death sentence.
Finally, in Table 2’s Model 3, Jury Cases, there was a negative relationship between
the defendant’s race and the likelihood of juries deciding on death, although it did not
reach statistical significance. White defendants were marginally more likely to receive life
sentences than nonwhite defendants. Looking at the jury cases only, 22 of 26 (85 percent)
white defendants received life sentences, compared to 24 of 30 (80 percent) of nonwhite
defendants. The small number of death sentences in the jury era, combined with the
modest difference between nonwhite and white defendants, suggest we should not
overinterpret this finding.
Finally, Model 4 (shown in Table 3) employed all of the cases and changed the
dichotomous judge or jury sentencer to a set of comparisons between (1) the jury versus the
first judge era and (2) the jury versus the post-Ring hybrid era. This allowed us to explore
whether the legal change following Ring modified the impact of the judge sentencing era
(as compared with the jury sentencing era), and whether the effects of other predictor
variables remained the same. The Model 4 results show that cases during the jury era were
significantly less likely to result in a death sentence than cases in both of the subsequent
eras in which the sentencing was done by the judge. The influence of the other predictor
variables in Models 3 and 4 were generally similar.
E. Additional Analyses
We also undertook several additional sets of analyses to shed light on the operation of
Delaware’s death penalty sentencing system.
92 Hans et al.
F. Unanimity and Judge-Jury Agreement
As part of the current hybrid sentencing scheme in Delaware, the jury votes on whether the
aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors in each capital case. This vote does not
need to be unanimous. The judge must then consider the jury recommendation and make
the ultimate sentencing decision. We used data from the jury votes in 82 of the judge
sentencing cases in our database. In five cases, the defendant waived the right to a jury trial
or to jury participation in sentencing and in the other cases the defendant became ineli-
gible for a death sentence following the jury’s votes. These data allow us to examine the
relationship between jury votes and judge sentencing decisions within the same cases in
Delaware.
Table 4 shows that, in this subset of cases, the jury was unanimous for death in only
10 (12 percent) of the penalty trials, whereas judges gave 41 death sentences overall. It
seems obvious that the requirement of jury unanimity during the jury era is a key explana-
tory factor in the difference between the judge and jury eras.
As illustrated in Table 4, Delaware judges followed unanimous juries in every case.
Judges gave death sentences in all 10 cases in which the jury unanimously found that
aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating circumstances. Judges also followed
unanimous votes in the two cases in which all jurors reached the opposite conclusion.
Table 3: Logistic Regression Model Predicting Death
Sentence at Capital Trial by Sentencing Era
β SE
Compared to jury era
Judge era 3.57*** 0.98
Hybrid era 2.28** 1.19
Aggravating factors 0.63*** 0.16
Mitigating factors 0.00 0.08
Heinousness 0.24* 0.12
Stranger (vs. nonstranger) 1.03* 0.47
Kent County (vs. other counties) 3.40*** 0.95
Compared to jury era
Kent * Judge −3.64** 1.24
Kent * Hybrid −2.95+ 1.63
White defendant −0.62 0.84
White victim 0.44 0.66
White defendant * White victim 0.77 0.81
Female victim 0.95+ 0.58
Intercept −5.90*** 1.24
Notes: ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; +p < 0.1; c statistic = 0.85.
Logistic regression models with robust clustered standard errors took
into account the existence of multiple cases with the same sentencing
judge. Standard errors are in parentheses. There were 43 distinct judges
across all cases (N = 146). Positive associations reflect increase in the
likelihood of a death sentence. The Kent * {Judge, Hybrid} interaction
terms contrast jury sentencing with judge and hybrid sentencing in Kent
County versus the other two counties combined. The White defendant *
White victim interaction further contrasts those cases against other race
of defendant-race of victim combinations.
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Judges gave death sentences only when it was recommended by a majority of the jury
in every case except that of Sadiki Garden, the death penalty decision that was subsequently
overturned by the Delaware Supreme Court.89 Thus, with a single exception, Delaware
judges did not override jury majorities when they recommended life sentences.
Judges were strongly inclined to follow the jury in 10–2 and 11–1 death recommen-
dations, deviating from the jury’s majority recommendation in only three of the 19 cases. As
might be expected, the greatest deviation came in cases in which smaller majorities favored
death and the case created more substantial opposition on the jury: in 9–3, 8–4, and 7–5
cases in which the jury’s majority recommended death, judges followed the jury’s recom-
mendations just half the time.
Table 4 shows that in death cases, judges appear less likely to give death as the jury’s
votes that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors decline from 12 to 7. Below that
bottom threshold, with the exception of the single judge override case, there are no judicial
decisions for death. The pattern is confirmed by a trend analysis. Applying a nonparametric
test for trends across ordered groups to these data, we find a significant trend for the
judge’s death decision (p = 0.002).90 In other words, the trend analysis supports the strong
impression from Table 4 that judicial decisions to give a death sentence are linked to jury
votes.
G. The Role of Judicial Experience and Other Judicial Characteristics
Judges frequently mention that it is likely to be difficult for the members of a jury when they
encounter for the first time the tremendous responsibility to decide whether a defendant
should live or die. In 1997, Delaware Judge Gebelein addressed the issue of Delaware juries’
reluctance to unanimously decide on death: “The jurors, just as the judge, live through a
murder trial for several weeks or perhaps even months. They get to know the defendant as
a human being in the courtroom. . . . It is not then a natural human occurrence to decide
in a cold, logical, deductive process to kill an individual whom you have come to know as
a human being.”91
89Garden v. State, 815 A.2d 327, 342 (Del. 2003); Garden v. State, 844 A.2d 311 (Del. 2004).
90Jack Cuzick, A Wilcoxon-Type Test for Trend, 4 Stat. in Med. 87 (1985).
91Richard Gebelein, A Judge’s View of the Death Penalty, in Society’s Final Solution 43, 44–45 (Laura E. Randa ed.,
1997).
Table 4: Comparison of Jury Votes and Judge Sentences During Judge Eras (n = 82)
Jury Vote Death–Life 0–12 1–11 2–10 3–9 4–8 5–7 6–6 7–5 8–4 9–3 10–2 11–1 12–0
Judge’s decision Death 0 0 0 1* 0 0 0 3 5 6 8 8 10
Life 2 5 1 3 5 5 3 7 3 4 2 1 0
*The sole judicial override of a majority vote favoring life occurred in the Sadiki Garden case. The judge’s death
sentence was twice set aside by the Delaware Supreme Court.
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It is possible that experience with homicide cases may make it less difficult for judges
to give death sentences. To explore the impact of judicial experience on the likelihood of
giving a death sentence, we compared the sentences in judges’ first capital sentencing case
versus their later cases. We also examined the number of capital trials judges had presided
over, including the current case, and the average years of their judicial service, for judges
who made life or death decisions. Finally, we contrasted the number of years left in the
judge’s current term for judges who made life or death decisions. Table 5 shows that,
overall, there were few differences in sentence outcomes on any of these variables measur-
ing judicial experience.
During the study’s time period, most of the superior court judges were white men.
Women judges decided just 9 percent of the capital cases over the time period. Close to half
the judges had previous experience as a prosecutor. Although there were insufficient
numbers of nonwhite judges in the database to do a comparison by the judge’s race, we
compared the proportion of life and death decisions made by women versus men judges,
and by judges with or without prosecutorial experience (see Table 5). Death sentences were
proportionately more common in cases with judges who had prosecutorial backgrounds.
Few other differences were apparent.
We entered these judicial characteristics into the Model 3, Judge Cases regression
equation to assess the extent to which these judicial characteristics were linked to case
outcomes, controlling for other predictor variables.92 In the expanded analysis, both the
gender of the judge and the fact that it was the judge’s first death penalty case in the
database significantly decreased the likelihood of a death sentence. Other judicial
92Judges’ career histories and terms of office were found using Superior Court History: Our Judicial Officers, Delaware
State Courts Website (2014), <http://courts.delaware.gov/superior/AboutUs/history3.stm>.
Table 5: Descriptive Measures of Judicial
Characteristics
Variable
All Cases Life Death
n (%) n (%) n (%)
Woman judge 12 (8.70) 9 (10.23) 3 (6.00)
Prosecutorial experience 60 (48.00) 35 (43.75) 25 (56.82)
Judge’s first case 16 (18.39) 9 (20.00) 7 (16.67)
Other Judicial Experience M (SD) M (SD) M (SD)
Case number 5.06 (3.40) 4.96 (3.31) 5.12 (3.55)
Years appointed 10.53 (6.07) 10.37 (5.80) 10.62 (6.47)
Term ends 6.16 (2.98) 5.63 (3.33) 6.65 (2.46)
Notes: Judge’s first case is a categorical variable indicating whether it is
the first capital case presided over by a judge. Case number refers to the
number of capital trials presided over by a judge (range: 1–13). Years
appointed refers to the number of years since the judge was appointed
(range: 1.55–27.27). Term ends refers to the number of years until the
end of the judge’s current term (range: 0.04–11.31). Cases with missing
judge information were excluded from the analysis.
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characteristics were not significant predictors of the sentence.93 Aggravating factors
remained a significant predictor. Heinousness, which was only a marginal predictor in the
original equation, became a statistically significant predictor of judges’ sentences, and
mitigating factors became a marginally significant predictor.94 Adding the judicial charac-
teristics to the Model 3, Judge Cases analysis boosted the c -statistic, a measure of the
goodness of fit of the model, from 0.77 to 0.87. The results linking certain judicial charac-
teristics to sentencing are intriguing, but we cannot rule out the possibility that they are
caused by other factors such as changes over time.
V. Discussion
In 1991, the Delaware legislature moved the central responsibility for capital sentencing
away from juries to judges. Legislators were motivated to do so because, in their view,
Delaware juries were overly reluctant to give death sentences in appropriate cases. They
anticipated that replacing the jury with the judge would increase the likelihood that capital
murders would be punished by death sentences. Our findings confirm that they were right.
Capital sentencing by judges in Delaware is associated with a substantially greater
likelihood of death sentences. The analyses reported here indicate that judge-jury differ-
ences in sentencing are unlikely to be explained by differences in the cases they face.
Although we are mindful that SHR homicide data are imperfect measures of the amount of
crime in Delaware, the examination of homicide rates over time suggested that crime rates
did not differ substantially across the judge and jury sentencing eras, and that prosecutors
did not appear to be more selective in capital litigation in the judge eras. If anything,
prosecutors sent a greater proportion of cases to capital penalty trials when they knew that
judges rather than juries would be the final arbiter of death. In addition, our statistical
models show that after controlling for important legally relevant factors and other predic-
tor variables, judge-jury differences continued to be statistically significant and substantial.
Our article explores a number of different reasons why judges may give proportion-
ately more death sentences than juries. The requirement in the jury era that the members
of the jury unanimously recommend death is surely a very significant factor. The decisions
of unanimous juries, whether the recommendation favored life or death, were always
followed by Delaware judges. However, juries reached a unanimous decision to recommend
life or death in only a fraction of the cases they considered. Juries unanimously found that
aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors in just 10 (12 percent) of the 82 judge
era cases for which we have jury vote data. That number is not far off from the number of
death sentences during the jury era.
93For the gender of the judge, β = –2.51, SE = 1.12, p = 0.025 (women judges less likely to give death sentences); for
a judge’s first versus subsequent death penalty case, β = 2.42, SE = 0.72, p = 0.001 (judges with previous case in
database more likely to give death sentences).
94For heinousness, β = 0.29, SE = 0.14, p = 0.04 (greater heinousness increased death sentences); for mitigating
factors, β = 0.21, SE = 0.12, p = 0.077 (greater number of mitigating factors associated with a marginal increase in
death sentences).
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Of course, the jury decisions in the jury and judge eras are not directly comparable
because in the jury era a unanimous binding decision was required and in the judge eras,
juries make advisory decisions that do not need to be unanimous. Research in other
contexts shows that jury deliberations under unanimity and majority decision rules differ
significantly.95 Juries deliberating under unanimity tend to discuss the case longer and to
have more thorough and robust deliberations. This may help explain the fact that juries in
hybrid capital sentencing approaches in other states, who are less likely to be required to
make a unanimous recommendation, report deliberating more quickly and less thor-
oughly, compared to jurors whose decision is binding.96
That said, there is a clear link between what jury majorities recommend and what
judges decide. The Delaware statute requires appropriate consideration, if not great weight
as in the earlier years of judge sentencing. And, of course, both judge and jury observe
the same cases. With some exceptions, the facts of the crime and the characteristics of the
defendant appear to affect them similarly, as we found when we contrasted results in the
Judge Cases and Jury Cases models. In this way our data reinforce the judge-jury agree-
ment studies that find substantial overlap in decisions reached by lay and professional
factfinders.
That a judicial sentencing approach in Delaware has led to increases in death
sentences is also in line with the judge-jury agreement studies finding that in cases in which
judges and juries disagree, the jury is apt to be more lenient. However, Delaware judges do
not show the same tendency to regularly override majority or unanimous jury recommen-
dations for life sentences, as had been the case in Florida and is currently the practice in
Alabama. And the regression analyses confirm that a key legally relevant variable, the
statutory aggravating factors in the case, is a significant predictor of both judge and jury
sentencing.
Nonetheless, some other results suggest a degree of arbitrariness in who receives the
death penalty in Delaware. Killing a woman, all else equal, is more likely to result in a death
sentence than killing a man.97 One of the strongest predictors of jury death sentences was
the county in which the homicide occurred. Kent County juries were much more apt to give
death than juries in the other two Delaware counties. Judges in Kent County did not show
the same effect. The county effect is baffling. Although Kent County is home to Dover Air
Force Base, the population is not noticeably more politically conservative, judging by voting
patterns over the three decades of the study period. Many of the factors that help explain
95Dennis J. Devine, Jury Decision Making: The State of the Science 44–46 (2012); Shari Seidman Diamond, Mary R.
Rose & Beth Murphy, Revisiting the Unanimity Requirement: The Behavior of the Non-Unanimous Civil Jury, 100 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 201 (2006); Valerie P. Hans, The Power of Twelve: The Impact of Jury Size and Unanimity on Civil Jury
Decision Making, 4 Del. L. Rev. 1 (2001). In a realistic jury simulation experiment that varied whether juries had to
be unanimous or could decide under majority rule, unanimous decision rule juries brought up more facts, discussed
important facts more thoroughly, corrected errors more frequently, and had more participation by jurors favoring
minority views. Reid Hastie, Steven D. Penrod & Nancy Pennington, Inside the Jury (1983).
96Bowers et al., supra note 2.
97Royer et al., supra note 5.
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regional disparities in death sentences in other states do not appear to vary in the expected
ways between Kent and the other two Delaware counties.98
The continuing evidence that race plays a role in Delaware’s death penalty is disturb-
ing. We note that the two cases that were driving forces in capital punishment legislative
change—the reinstatement of capital punishment in the 1960s and the Brooks armored car
case in 1991—were cases in which black defendants killed white victims. The Sadiki Garden
case, which ultimately led the Delaware legislature to reduce the weight judges are required
to give to the jury’s recommendation, also involved a black defendant and a white victim.
Our earlier analysis of Delaware death sentencing rates by race of defendant and race of
victim showed that the highest rates were in black defendant-white victim cases.99 Indeed,
we found that the race of victim differences in death-sentencing rates were stronger in
Delaware than in any other state. The victim race results from the Delaware system of capital
punishment echo racial patterns found in a number of other jurisdictions.100
Comparisons of death-sentencing rates, however, do not pinpoint the stage at which
race of victim effects are created. In the models reported here, we find that narrowing the
lens to those cases that reach the penalty phase of a capital trial did not show statistically
significant victim race effects, suggesting that much of the overall disparity is attributable to
discrimination in the decision to seek death.
Judge Barron, who sentenced five people to death in Delaware during his career,
earning him the nickname the “hanging judge,” voiced concern over the arbitrariness of
the death penalty in Delaware on the basis of his judicial experiences. Judge Barron stated
that “having personally observed the exercise of the death penalty statute over the past two
decades, I now conclude that the process under the law is flawed . . . [I]t is impossible to
justify why some murderers receive the death penalty while others, whose crimes are
arguably worse in degree or savagery, do not.”101
We wish to close with some reflections about the constitutionality of judge sentencing.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Woodward v. Alabama called into
question the constitutionality of judge sentencing in capital cases for two reasons, both of
which are applicable to Delaware. First, the small handful of states that allow judges—rather
than juries—to impose the ultimate punishment leaves the practice subject to challenge
under the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment. In analyzing capital
sentencing practices under the Eighth Amendment, the Court (as it reaffirmed last term in
Hall v. Florida102) has looked for consensus in state practices to determine whether a state
98See discussion of county effects in Johnson et al., supra note 5, at 1936–38.
99Johnson et al., supra note 5.
100See, e.g., Baldus et al. (Georgia), supra note 4; Raymond Paternoster, Race of Victim and Location of Crime: The
Decision to Seek the Death Penalty in South Carolina, 74 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 754, 767 tbl. 1 (1983) (South
Carolina); Michael Radelet, Racial Characteristics and the Imposition of the Death Penalty, 46 Am. Soc. Rev. 918
(1981) (Florida).
101Norman Barron, Costs of Imposing Death Penalty Outweigh Benefits, Delaware Online, Apr. 23, 2013.
102572 U.S. ___ (2014).
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capital sentencing scheme is out of step with “evolving standards of decency.” The fact that
only a few states currently allow judges to impose death sentences renders the practice
suspect on that basis. Our research shows that the replacement of juries by judges has a strong
and significant impact, increasing the likelihood of death sentences. This is also out of step
with the dwindling number of death sentences imposed by juries.
Second, as noted previously, the Court has held that the Sixth Amendment requires
juries—and not judges—to find facts making a person eligible for the death penalty.
Although the Delaware legislature concluded that a defendant is “death-eligible” when the
jury finds the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, thus allowing for judges to
then impose the ultimate sentence, that conclusion is dubious as a matter of Delaware
practice and constitutional law. The Delaware capital sentencing scheme only allows a
death sentence to be imposed by the trial judge if the aggravating circumstances outweigh
the mitigating circumstances. If they do not (if the mitigating circumstances outweigh the
aggravating circumstances or the two are in equipoise), the defendant must be sentenced
to life imprisonment. Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Woodward argues—we think with some
force—that it is not until the conclusion of the weighing process that a capital defendant in
Alabama (and thus in Delaware) is “death-eligible.” If this is correct, then the Sixth
Amendment requires that juries—not judges—determine whether a capital defendant
should live or die.
Appendix 1: Capital Trials and Death Sentences for
Attorney General by Era
Era Capital Trials*
Death Sentences+
(Percent of Cases)
Jury Era
Richard R. Wier 8 2
(Jan. 1975–Jan. 1979) (25.0)
Richard S. Gebelein 18 5
(Jan. 1979–Jan. 1983) (27.8)
Charles M. Oberly 32 4
(Jan. 1983–Nov. 1991) (12.5)
Judge Era
Charles M. Oberly 30 16
(Nov. 1991–Jan. 1995) (53.3)
M. Jane Brady 28 15
(Jan. 1995–Jun. 2001) (55.6)
Hybrid Era
M. Jane Brady 26 10
(Jun. 2001–Dec. 2005) (38.5)
Carl Danberg 3 1
(Dec. 2005–Jan. 2007) (33.3)
Joseph R. Beau Biden II 1 1
(Jan. 2007–end of study period) (100)
*The number of capital cases that reached the sentencing phase of trial.
+The number of death sentences compared to the total number of capital trials during the time period.
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